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Abstract:  This review considers the use of technology in law enforcement 
contexts, focusing on evidence of resistance to particular forms of intervention. 
Whilst ‘Big Brother’  and ‘civil liberties’  narratives dominate the academic 
discussion of opposition in this area, this paper focuses on reviewing evidence of 
the more routine adaptations that characterise many people’s response to 
attempts to change their behaviour. Discussion of some frequently encountered 
technologies (including CCTV and speed cameras) is situated within a reflection on 
the changes in conceptualisations of both ‘crime’  and ‘the criminal’  observable 
over recent decades. Many acts of resistance within this context can, it is 
proposed, be understood not as examples of ideological opposition, but as rational 
and predominantly self-interested responses to these new conditions. 
  
 
Getting around and getting on: Self-interested resistance to technology  
in law enforcement contexts 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper considers examples of the public’s relationships with law enforcement 
technology, focusing on forms of public resistance against such interventions. The 
resistant strategies considered are, however, more practical and self-interested 
and have more modest intentions than challenges couched in ‘Big Brother or ‘civil 
liberties’  terms which characterise mass protest or social movements (Coleman & 
McCahill, 2011). The discussion is located within changes in the conceptualisation 
of crime and criminals which have occurred over recent decades, and which have 
seen; a move away from a welfare based, transformative aim for criminal justice 
to more limited ambitions (Kemshall, 2003:16) an increasing responsibilisation of 
both offenders and victims, expected to take a rational approach to their own 
behaviour (Rose, 1996; Loader & Sparks, 2002); the emphasis on risk as a 
justification for interventions (Feeley & Simon, 1992, 1994); increases in regulation 
(furthering the disconnection from a moral basis to many laws) (ibid; McGuire, 
2012:26); increased ontological insecurity and the need to actively construct and 
defend one’s own identity (Giddens, 1991; Mythen, 2005); and optimism about the 
potential of technology to influence rational decision makers (Cornish & Clarke, 
1987; Norris, 2012). Such developments, it is suggested, have inevitably led to an 
increase in the use of crime control technologies, but have also created the 
conditions in which low-level, daily acts of resistance to those technologies can 
flourish.  The themes and practices of resistance explored here are based in the 
rational choices of (often) rational choice actors who, rather than accept the 
determinations of technology, take steps to avoid its effects in ways that allow 
them to continue with the behaviour they had previously rationally chosen to 
adopt. Rather than making the ‘rationality mistake’  (Barlow & Duncan, 1999), 
therefore, technological interventions may be guilty of not taking that presumed 
rationality far enough, or at least of assuming that the rational actor will choose to 
conform rather than to continue to offend if offending is the easiest option. 
 
This is not confined to traditionally conceived offending ‘others’  but, by virtue of 
the shifts in conceptualisation noted above, also includes populations traditionally 
able to conceive of themselves as ‘law-abiding’  who now find their behaviour 
recast as ‘risky’  and hence problematised. The responses and concerns evidenced 
here are more “self-interested”  (Marx, 2003) or “instrumental”  (Marx, 2009) and 
individualised, than principled ideological resistance. They are often contradictory 
and demonstrate mixed enthusiasm for law enforcement based around the appeal 
of technology as a remedy for the problematic behaviour of others, coupled with a 
resistance to attempts to change personally convenient (though illegal) behaviour 
of our own. The paper therefore attempts to provide an overview of ideas of 
resistance that offer an alternative to discussions of technology in law 
enforcement contexts that characterise its use either in terms of technological 
appeal or collectivised, ideological resistance to surveillance. 
  
 
 
 
 
Technology and Criminal Justice 
 
Kearon identifies the period since the 1980s as witnessing the “proliferation of new 
technologies employed by criminal justice and other regulatory agencies”  (2013: 
415). Whether it be devices for deterring offenders or recording evidence of their 
transgressions (e.g. CCTV, speed cameras), devices for identifying ‘risky’ 
characteristics of individuals (e.g. ANPR), measures to prevent specific offences 
such as terrorism (e.g. airport body scanners) or interventions that target-harden 
previously attractive goods (e.g. phones that can be disabled if stolen, measures to 
prevent illegal downloading), machines are routinely deployed to deter or prevent 
certain behaviours. Considerable faith is placed in the ability of inanimate objects 
to change behaviour (by deterring, target hardening, recording, identifying) in 
ways that humans have, thus far, seemingly failed to do. This persists, it seems, 
even when those technologies demonstrably fail to live up to their promises 
(Haggerty, 2004; Kearon, 2013). 
Whilst technology is understood to be progressive, efficient, effective, or even as a 
“silver bullet”  (Marx, 1995) for crime problems, it is not universally welcomed. 
Resistance narratives, often originating in surveillance studies literature, use 
familiar tropes such as ‘Big Brother’, the emergence of a ‘surveillance society’  or 
claim infringements of civil liberties, but what of the driver who gets someone else 
to blow into an alcohol-monitor to provide a ‘clean’  sample of breath (Marx, 2003: 
378), or the driver who responds to a warning from a speed camera detector by 
slowing down to the speed limit, before speeding up again (Corbett & Simon, 
1999)? What are we to make of the individual who knows exactly where the CCTV 
cameras are and simply avoids them, or covers their face to hide their identity 
(Marx, 2003; Coleman & McCahill, 2011)? What of the individual who downloads 
music illegally because it can be done (Ulsperger, Hodges & Paul, 2010)? These 
individuals (some traditionally understood ‘offenders’, others not) are engaging in 
their own acts of resistance, though it is by no means certain that is correct to 
credit them with any kind of ideological underpinnings. Whilst these types of 
resistance are neglected, there is reason to suspect that they are both more 
common than ideologically informed responses, and more likely given recent 
changes in the conceptualisation of crime and criminals. 
 
The reconceptualization of crime and criminals 
 
The increasing use of technology must be viewed in relation to changes in the 
conceptualisation of crime and criminals which have occurred over recent 
decades. Bauman (1987) has observed that, from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, 
attempts at establishing intellectual legitimation for governance projects declined, 
with reliance placed instead on the promises of securing compliance through 
surveillance. Alongside this, a move away from a moralised, transformative aim for 
criminal justice to more limited ambitions has been widely observed (Feeley & 
Simon, 1992; Kemshall, 2003). The failure of the welfarist paradigm has seen 
  
criminal justice successes recast and redefined, with efforts to rehabilitate and 
reform the individual no longer deemed necessary. Behavioural change, rather 
than attitude change is sufficient.  
Parallel to this reinvention of success has been a reinvention of causation. Rather 
than a product of social or economic circumstances, crime is seen, from a neo-
liberal perspective, as a choice. If offenders choose to commit crime, then their 
choices can be influenced. With offenders seen as rationally manipulable, 
technology becomes a logical method of influencing those choices (either in terms 
of prevention or deterrence) that is less resource intensive and more reliable than 
a human agent seeking to secure the same effect.  
These reconceptualisations fit perfectly with a technologically-driven criminal 
justice infrastructure: the inability of technology to conceptualise and reflect 
issues such as intent or mitigation is unproblematic when a risk narrative operates, 
given that the prevention of risky behaviour becomes the end-goal and it is 
irrelevant whether that risky behaviour was intentionally engaged in or not (Wells, 
2012: 33-34). Rather than a moral code, Lessig (1999: 89 cited in McGuire, 2012) 
suggests that the code associated with regulatory technologies and what can be 
done dominates producing “constraints that operate largely autonomously and 
according to technical rather than legal or normative imperatives.”  (McGuire, 
2012:26). Crucially, technology “does this without reflection or debate nor any 
normative assessment of the desirability of our behaviour’s being so constrained” 
(ibid: 26) and, it is suggested, our responses may also be increasingly lacking in 
normative consideration as a result. What can be done is done, displacing 
arguments (on both sides) about what should be done. Crime problems are thus 
rendered techno-fixable, in theory at least. 
Furthermore, an increasing focus on ‘risk’  (rather than morality) as a characteristic 
determining punishable action can be traced, with ‘dividuals’    (Deleuze, 1995) 
viewed as collections of ‘risk factors’  (Haggerty, 2004: 222) rather than complete, 
moral, beings. Whole new behaviours become legitimate criminal justice targets 
because of their understanding in risk terms, and a growth in mala prohibita 
regulation, often based on strict liability legal principles, is inevitable. This (as 
well as broader trends of late modernity) leads to ontological insecurity, with 
identities no longer inherited or reliable, but needing constant construction and 
reconstruction. No longer is a law-abiding self-identity sufficient to protect its 
owner from criminalisation. Unintentional behaviours, behaviours that were 
previously treated as unproblematic, behaviours we do not feel are worthy of 
attention – all become fair game in this new and frightening world.  
Whilst the potential offender is increasingly understood as a rational, calculating 
homo economicus, the potential victim is increasingly understood in the same 
terms and, at times, the difference between the two can be obscured.  The 
responsibilised neo-liberal citizen is cajoled and enticed into purchasing 
technologically-based solutions that offer that elusive commodity ‘security’ 
(Zedner, 2009), with those unable or unwilling to do so being left to be, and feel, 
relatively less secure through their absence. Not only are they vulnerable, but they 
are increasingly “recast as imprudent and reckless, blameworthy and responsible 
for their own misfortune”  (Kemshall, 2003:19). Whilst victimisation is to be 
resisted, therefore, so is criminalisation, with the latter potentially experienced as 
  
the former (Wells, 2007). Whilst gadgets may be offered that claim to provide 
protection from the actions of criminals, marketed alongside them are similar 
products that may render one less vulnerable to ‘victimisation’  by the state itself 
(ibid). When the activities of others threaten the law-abiding or respectable 
identity, threaten to label one as risky, less worthy, even unemployable, it is likely 
that those activities will be resisted, whether they are the actions of criminals or 
the actions of the state in trying to label us as problematic. The successfully 
responsibilised citizen, therefore, may be expected to resist criminalisation as 
enthusiastically as they resist victimisation.  
Of course, offenders respond to changes that affect their chances of success, and 
always have done (Coleman & McCahill, 2011; Felson, 2006). Burglars started 
wearing gloves when fingerprinting technologies were in their infancy and the 
history of situational crime prevention is one of move and counter-move by 
offenders (as well as victims) engaged in an “arms race”  (Ekblom, 1997; Marx, 
2003; McQuade, 2006).  Furthermore, actors, on encountering technologies 
designed to shape their behaviour, do not operate on the basis of perfect 
knowledge about the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1987), nor do they have perfect knowledge of the ‘real’  risks 
associated with the proscribed behaviour. Their limited knowledge is as likely to 
be about the limitations of the technology in front of them as it is about the rather 
obscure and intangible possible unpleasant outcomes associated with failing to 
comply. Why not, then, devote effort to negotiating the obstacle at minimum 
personal inconvenience, rather than abandon the advantageous behaviour? Should 
we not expect the street criminal to offend elsewhere rather than in the presence 
of a camera, the speeding driver to equip themselves with knowledge about ‘safe’ 
(camera-less) and ‘dangerous’  (camera-covered) locations, the airline passenger to 
attempt to circumvent security procedures rather than have to pay inflated 
amounts for a bottle of water in-flight? When, as considered above, law 
enforcement technologies are increasingly distant from moral appeals and 
normative rationalisations, isn’t this kind of response only to be expected? 
 
The acts of resistance explored here may be deemed “thin”  resistance (Raby, 
2005) in that they tend to take place in localised settings, rather than  “thick” 
(whereby structural power is challenged). Others might more accurately 
characterise it as ‘contestation’  - “understood as those activities that undermine 
regulations and rules in a micro context”  (Coleman & McCahill, 2011:146). Others 
have suggested that the term resistance “should be reserved for visible, collective 
acts that result in social change”  (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004: 451) and not 
“everyday acts…that chip away at power in almost imperceptible ways”  (Rubin 
1996 cited in Hollander & Einwohner, 2004: 451). However it has been suggested 
that “any definition of resistance should retain the ‘everyday strategies’  used by 
individuals or social groups. To dismiss these everyday strategies ignores the 
attitudes and behaviour expressed by many people in their everyday lives” 
(Coleman & McCahill, 2011:146). Yet there is still little to be found about what 
attitudes and behaviours are being expressed, or what meaning or reasoning can be 
found in such examples. Marx notes eleven types of resistance, admirably 
demonstrating the range of oppositional behaviour, but claims that “In spite of the 
obvious moral difference [it is possible to] treat these two generic types as 
behaviorally equivalent”  (2003:374). Whilst the behavioural outcome may be 
  
similar, I would argue that motivation is important whether your aim is 
understanding, rallying, or controlling those exhibiting that behaviour.  
 
But what are we to make of the central role of technology in these responses? 
What is it about technology that makes it liable to adaptive responses that are 
apparently devoid of grand ideological justifications? What are we, further, to 
make of the evidence of the popularity of some technological interventions – 
demand for more CCTV, more speed enforcement, acceptance of some airport 
security innovations? What do we learn by looking at technologies that seek to 
influence those that are not traditionally conceptualised as criminal? 
 
Case studies in self-interested resistance 
 
It would be impossible, in one contribution, to cover all law enforcement 
technologies, to consider all the arguments for and against their use, the evidence 
of effectiveness, or the evidence of public support or opposition. Indeed much has 
been done on this elsewhere (see for example McGuire, 2012; Kearon, 2013). What 
this paper can do is consider evidence of public resistance to a few key example 
technologies, setting some ostensibly similar technologies against one another to 
account for differences in reaction. It proposes that, in the case of technological 
interventions, it is worth considering ‘the public’  as comprised of offenders and 
potential offenders, victims and potential victims, rather than ‘the public’  as 
somehow dichotomous with ‘offenders’. As such, the new and unsettling 
encounters between previously ‘law-abiding’  citizens (Wells, 2012) and control 
technologies will be explored. As will become apparent, one of the key reasons put 
forward for resistance that does not draw on privacy narratives is that of the 
appropriate focus for surveillance and control (versus the inappropriate). The 
distinction between the ‘us’  and ‘them’  of much criminology (and even more 
criminal justice policy) is itself offered as a reason for resistance, rather than 
adopted as an organising narrative. That this reason for resistance exists does not 
undermine previous claims for the lack of an ideological basis for action –  rather it 
emphases the individual, self-interested nature of the responses.  
 
Two case studies are focused upon, below, with a final section devoted to 
suggesting other examples that might prove fruitful for further study, using the 
framework provided here. As I have argued elsewhere, “[i]t may be possible to 
draw a distinction between resistance to surveillance predicated upon social 
concerns, and resistance to surveillance predicated upon individual costs and 
harms.”  (Wells & Wills, 2009: 273). This paper rounds up some of the ‘costs and 
harms’‐based forms of resistance that characterise aspects of the opposition to law 
enforcement technology. It uses these to attempt to explain the mixed enthusiasm 
that the public appears to show for a range of ostensibly similar law enforcement 
technologies as well as the evidence of resistance to some technologies. 
The paper first engages with what is considered to be one of the more accepted 
techno-fixes –  CCTV. The second case study considers the example of speed 
cameras (and to a lesser extent their ostensibly similar technology of ANPR 
cameras). This second example allows us to explore resistance that has been both 
heavily publicised and which features those that might traditionally have been 
thought to form the groundswell of potential crime victims who are the audience 
  
for positive claims about the usefulness of technology. The final section considers 
a range of other technological interventions that have met with a range of 
responses. The focus is on the kinds of resistance that eschew grand oppositional 
narratives in favour of a range of often rationally motivated responses to the 
limited capabilities of crime control technologies.  
 
CCTV  
Of all the technologies associated in some way with the prevention and/or 
detection of crime, CCTV stands out as one of the most widespread and, it might 
be suggested, accepted. In most discussions on this topic, the focus is on the 
exponential rise in coverage (see the collection edited by Doyle, Lippert & Lyon, 
2012), debates about its effectiveness (for example Gill & Spriggs, 2005; or 
Coleman & Norris, 2013 for a comprehensive introduction) or levels of public 
support (for example Ditton, 1998; or Dawson, 2012 for a recent international 
overview). In many cases this is presented alongside discussions drawing on the 
surveillance studies tradition, where concerns about privacy and a ‘Big Brother’ 
narrative are often articulated (though increasingly academic contributions do 
critique their predecessors for over-stating the significance of this narrative; see 
for example Fyfe & Bannister, 1996; Waiton, 2010). It has been suggested that 
these concerns seem to evidence an academic preoccupation, with some failing to 
locate, and noting their failure to locate, widespread public anxiety about CCTV as 
a general law enforcement and deterrence tool (Gilliom, 2006; Loader, Goold & 
Thumala, 2013). This section begins by briefly proposing a number of reasons for 
the absence of widespread public concern, which can be juxtaposed with later, 
more controversial, technological interventions. It also notes and theorises 
suggestions made recently about possible limits to the public’s appetite for image 
capture in the name of security production, whilst suggesting that those subject to 
CCTV’s gaze may be viewed as operating in ‘resistant’  forms which are entirely to 
be expected given the framing discussions of the previous section.  
This is not the place to go into arguments about the effectiveness of CCTV (indeed 
many have done this already) but for these purposes it seems safe to conclude that 
CCTV has not unequivocally demonstrated any ‘magic bullet’  status that could be 
offered as a simple explanation for its popularity. Indeed the effectiveness of 
CCTV is, it has been shown, dependent on time, place and the crime being 
focussed upon (See for example Gill & Spriggs on the relative contribution of CCTV 
to car parks versus town centres (2005))  
 
Whilst it is complicated to attempt to prove a deterrent impact, the idea that the 
rational offender might ‘think twice’  has some persuasive power, even if the 
actual effect is only to relocate that harm to another time or place (Short & 
Ditton, 1998).  As Norris observes, camera surveillance is based on the assumption 
that “it will influence the decision-making of the ‘rational’  offender who, on 
calculating the risks, will choose not to commit the crime under the gaze of the 
cameras as this will increase the probability of being caught”(2012:34) and this has 
intuitive appeal, seemingly, for politicians and the public.  
 
  
The promotion of CCTV as a crime prevention tool for street crime offences 
primarily (robbery, assault etc.) also serves to reinforce the ‘us’  and ‘them’ 
distinction that supports a traditional view of the law-abiding masses and the 
minority of deviant ‘others’. As will become clear in relation to other (ostensibly 
similar) technologies, explored below, this contributes to its essentially reassuring 
presence. With the likely offender conceptualised in traditional and consensual 
terms, for the majority CCTV can be case as a further policing presence only likely 
to be utilised in their favour if they become a victim.  
 
However, as Loader et al note, there are limits to the take-for-granted and 
supported status of CCTV. They identify certain “frontiers”  (2013:977) where 
public acceptance may be caveated or withdrawn. These are considered below, 
along with other forms of what might be termed resistance from those 
traditionally constructed as the targets, rather than beneficiaries, of CCTV 
surveillance.  
 
Resistance to CCTV 
 
It is clear that the broad acceptability of CCTV does not extend –  indeed has never 
extended   - to all those that fall within its gaze. Many of the ongoing discussions 
about the effectiveness of CCTV may actually be viewed as discussions about 
resistance (more commonly described as ‘displacement’  in this context), though 
they have not been classed in the same –  almost heroic –  category as those that 
have ideological objections to surveillance. It may be that potential offenders, for 
example, offend in a different place or time to that which they had originally 
planned, as a result of the presence of CCTV (Short & Ditton, 1998; Marx, 
2003:376), or change their modus operandi, hide their face or disable cameras 
(Coleman & McCahill, 2011), or offend at night when cameras may be less able to 
record viable images.  Some adaptive behaviour may be adopted by those who 
have no intention to offend, but who do not want to be followed by camera 
operators, such as the youths in Taylor, Evans & Faser’s (1996) and Coleman & 
McCahill’s (2011) research who avoided congregating in large groups, or being seen 
with known criminals. In each case, the surveilled subjects are resisting the tool 
and undermining its impact based on knowledge of how and when it works. They 
are then processing that information, and information about the expected gains 
associated with pursuing an existing course of action, in order to arrive at a 
decision about continuing or adapting that action.  
 
Given the absence of total surveillance coverage, combined with the separation of 
crime control from its moral foundations as occurs via the use of technology, such 
responses are predictable to the point of being obvious. In fact, as McQuade (2006) 
argues, those criminals who do not adapt to circumvent the abilities of new 
technologies remain more at risk of capture until they adapt –  representing that 
adaptation as a natural and inevitable process. The very principle on which CCTV is 
supposed to  work (its ability to influence the choice to offend or not to offend) 
undermines its effectiveness when that principle sees rational choosers choose to 
find other ways to achieve gain, rather than to abstain. It might usefully be looked 
at as an expected response to technological interventions that make no effort 
(indeed can make no effort) to challenge or change internal morality.  
  
 
Despite the evidence that CCTV is broadly accepted, even popular with the ‘law-
abiding’  public envisaged as its beneficiaries, Loader et al suggest that there are 
developments which may “press up against the limits of banality in ways that risk 
unsettling security practices whose social value and utility have come to be taken 
for granted.”  (2013:977). They note that recent developments such as ‘nanny 
cams’  (installed by families to keep watch over those employed to look after their 
children), cameras in baby-changing facilities, and cameras installed by owners 
within their own homes (where one might be a guest) did cause “distinct unease” 
(ibid: 990) amongst their research subjects.  
 
The authors speculate that issues of trust and privacy explain their participants’ 
feelings that ‘things had gone too far’  and that some situations should remain 
beyond the camera’s (and indeed the camera operator’s) gaze. Even here, 
however, Loader et al’s respondents were mixed in their responses, with some 
seeing no reason to object if, as often heard in this context, those being watched 
‘were doing nothing wrong’. Interestingly, the increased likelihood of image 
capture also caused some to express concern about their potentially legal but 
nonetheless potentially problematic activities. Examples offered, with some 
degree of vagueness that we perhaps have to fill in for ourselves, included wanting 
“to creep down [the street] and have a word with someone you shouldn’t be 
having a word with”  and “visiting your boyfriend down the street”  (ibid: 13). In 
such contexts, those ‘doing nothing wrong’  (and hence having nothing to fear) did 
not correlate comfortably with the vision of the clearly defined criminal from 
whom CCTV protects the law-abiding. What behaviours should and should not 
invite a response (of whatever form) and who should be responsible for initiating 
that response? Seemingly, these questions were less pressing when the target was 
someone else, doing something that offended us, than they are when our own 
behaviour comes under scrutiny. Such issues are considered further below. 
 
Technology and the motorist 
This section considers one area of activity that is, perhaps more than any other 
area, seeing increasing use of enforcement by technology (Corbett, 2008a PACTS, 
2005). The combination of considerable potential for harm to others, with 
convenient culprit identifiability (in the form of license plates), makes the road 
traffic context a particularly attractive hunting ground for technologies that 
promise both to make roads safer and impact upon traditional criminality. 
From a risk perspective, road use is a logical focus for preventative action. Road 
crashes still account for large numbers of deaths and, whilst they may be caused 
by behaviour anywhere on a spectrum from deliberate to completely unintentional 
(via reckless, careless and dangerous in between), road traffic offences are often 
able to be conceptualised as relatively simple acts, or omissions. This makes them 
appear peculiarly apt for technological enforcement, whether that is a speed 
camera or breathalyser (detecting whether a presented action is above or below a 
set limit demarcating problematic/unproblematic behaviour) or an ANPR 
(automated number plate recognition) database (where 
problematic/unproblematic is determined by presence/absence from certain 
  
databases), many road traffic offences are amenable to the kind of strict liability 
legal construction that renders them particularly ‘techno-fixable’  - at least in 
theory (Wells, 2008). 
But, as a case study for public resistance to law enforcement technology, roads 
provide ample examples, not least in the form of speed cameras (the main focus of 
what follows). Historically, enforcement of the road traffic law has always been 
contentious (Emsley, 1993), given that it thrusts groups of people who traditionally 
conceptualise themselves as recipients of policing services (rather than of police 
attention) into unsolicited, negative outcome encounters with law enforcers 
(Wells, 2008; Corbett, 2008a, b). Technology is centrally implicated in this because 
it is technology that allows for many road traffic laws to be enforced in large 
numbers, problematizing behaviours that, historically, would not have been 
enforced due to lack of manpower (despite being illegal). As such, and as a result 
of the combing of risk logic with technology, what were once largely dormant laws 
are now very real in their consequences for many people who may previously have 
been able to maintain the idea that they were law-abiding. In many cases it is 
speed cameras and ANPR systems that characterise these encounters, watching 
over the road network with a view to the identification of motor vehicles being 
used in an illegal manner, and potentially leading to the offending individual being 
traced and punished.  
Over 12 million prosecutions for speeding have been made possible by speed 
cameras over the past 10 years in the UK alone (Povey et al, 2011: 63) while it has 
been claimed that the introduction of ANPR by UK police forces claims has resulted 
in a tenfold increase in the number of arrests attributed to officers using it. In the 
latter case, offences detected have included both vehicle-related document 
offences (having no tax, MOT, insurance, etc.) as well as theft of motor vehicles, 
drug offences, immigration offences and the capture of people on arrest warrants 
(Home Office, 2004, 2006, 2007). Enduring and, at times, heated discussions about 
the status of speed cameras as a legitimate road safety intervention have 
accompanied their use and taken place in various realms during the last decade 
(Wells, 2011). From government, to the editor’s desk to the dinner table, 
everyone, it seems, has a view on the use of speed cameras and on the ways in 
which they should be financed, operated and deployed. The response to ANPR has 
been, seemingly, more restrained and the technology has enjoyed more 
widespread acceptance. Whilst the potential for deploying Big Brother narratives 
seems considerable, Corbett’s (2008a: 8) observation that issues such as the sale 
of data resulting from the use of ANPR cameras are ‘clearly a matter of serious 
concern’  and that ‘justifiable fears remain’  (ibid: 10) seem to characterize the 
(limited) academic debate about this technology more so than they do the public 
debate. Seemingly ANPR enjoys the status of ‘like CCTV’  more than it endures the 
status of ‘like speed cameras’  despite focusing on motorists and their deviant 
behaviours.  
 
As such, the two technologies provide a useful comparison for exploring the 
reasons why some technologies generate more resistance than others. Firstly, the 
acts of resistance detectable in relation to speed cameras are considered, before 
the reasons for them are unpicked. These reasons are then considered alongside 
  
the ANPR example to begin to formulate some explanations for differential 
reactions to law enforcement technologies.  
 
Resistance to speed cameras 
 
Whilst most drivers would not, presumably, advocate the firebombing or other 
vandalism of speed cameras perpetrated by such characters as Captain Gatso (UK) 
and the Tuff Tuff club (Netherlands) as well as numerous offenders acting 
independently (Wells & Wills, 2009), evidence suggests that most drivers engage in 
daily acts of resistance to the technology. Research suggests that between 79% 
(Stradling et al, 2003) and 99% (Corbett, 2003:111) of drivers admit to speeding on 
occasion, suggesting that the law is not one that enjoys great levels of respect. 
Corbett has proposed a typology of responses to speed cameras, only one of which 
is compliant with the spirit of the law. Whilst drivers who obeyed speed limits 
generally (and regardless of speed cameras) were deemed ‘compliers’, others 
were variously labelled ‘the deterred’  (put off speeding by speed cameras, but 
presumably not likely to continue to comply if the threat of detection was 
removed), ‘manipulators’  (who slowed down for speed cameras and sped up 
afterwards) and ‘defiers’  (who continued to speed regardless) (Corbett, 2000). 
Blincoe et al explored the application of these typologies in 2006 (in the UK) and 
found that only a third identified as conformers, (presumably) appreciating the 
validity of the law as applied to speed limits. A further third were active 
‘manipulators’  who conformed to the law only where it was necessary to evade 
detection (2005: 373). 
Clearly, there are many forms of response to the limited functionality of the speed 
camera, each of which presumably appears rational to their users. Some do adapt 
to comply (at least at camera locations), but many rationally adopt other 
behaviours, many of which may be deemed resistance and almost totally 
undermine the technology. What this suggests is that the reason for the law (the 
relationship between the act of exceeding the speed limit and the suggested 
harmful outcome) is not accepted uncritically or universally by drivers.  
 
The speed camera context presents a number of characteristics that make such 
resistant responses more likely. The behaviour itself is mala prohibita (rather than 
mala in se) and relies on the convincing communication of the risk-based rationale 
underpinning it for its legitimacy. The demonopolisation of expertise characteristic 
of the ‘risk society’  (Beck, 1992) produces a range of ‘expert’  voices who can 
provide alternative rationales for enforcement (ones that situate the driver in the 
role of victim of unjust state practices, rather than as culpable offender for 
example) (Wells, 2011). This means that there is ample opportunity for 
neutralising the inconvenient state logic that has suddenly recast the ordinary 
driver as an offender. If no risk is presumed to result from driving too fast, but 
instead positive outcomes are observed (for example, getting there quicker), then 
the speed camera becomes just another obstacle to be avoided, or negotiated 
around. More than this, in fact, the speed camera becomes another source of risk 
for the responsibilised neo-liberal citizen to seek protection from –  protection for 
their driving licence (and perhaps, via this, their employment), their no claims 
bonus and even their law-abiding identity itself (Wells, 2007). For some drivers, 
who do not want to rely on their own ability to spot cameras and slow down in 
  
time, their responsibilised self-defensive action may take the form of buying other 
technologies –  this time technologies of resistance –  such as a speed camera 
detector (for jurisdictions that do not publicise the location of cameras to give 
drivers a fighting chance), a radar jammer (still useful for inhibiting ‘sneaky’ 
mobile enforcement), a radar-resistant number plate coating, or the less high-tech 
application of a layer of mud (to hide the car’s identity and thus render its driver 
immune from being held to account). These actions are, to the driving offender 
with a livelihood, identity, or both, to protect, logical actions, particularly if the 
individual has previously been able to dismiss the law which they are breaking as 
unjustified, unfair, or illegitimate and hence to neutralise any moral concerns 
associated with the action.  
 
There are further (non-technological) options for the responsibilised ‘law-abiding’ 
road traffic offender –  for example guides to identifying loopholes in laws (that 
make prosecutions invalid), or points swapping (where a relative or paid stranger 
takes the point to preserve a clean licence for the offender, or to prevent them 
from receiving a ban). These are the practical steps that can be taken once the 
initial rationalising has taken place. For those for whom the reasoning behind the 
technology is not sufficiently well proven, or for whom the possibility of causing 
the associated harm appears remote, the technology becomes simply an 
impediment to free and easy driving, to be negotiated like any other obstacle. Like 
a can of de-icer that prevents ice from stopping you in your tracks. Ice is not 
moralised, it can be vanquished without personal hand-wringing, the de-icer used 
without the need for moral reflection. It is simply a tool that allows its user to 
achieve a desired goal.  
Whilst the criminal justice system may be increasingly seeing its subjects as 
dividuals (Deleuze, 1995) - as bundles of risk factors, as triggering or not triggering 
an intervention based on some decontextualized action, as predictable calculating 
beings - those subjects may not see themselves in the same way. As such, 
identities such as ‘law-abiding’, ‘responsible’, ‘respectable’  etc. remain important 
to individuals who, as rational actors, may be as likely to adopt strategies to resist 
their unpleasant dividualisation, as they are to comply with what the technology 
intended in the first place. These identities are complex and multi-faceted whilst 
the technology recognizes only isolated indicators of worth. 
Indeed there are many reasons why resistance to the technology, and therefore to 
the labels it seeks to attach, is not only appealing but necessary to the 
responsibilised citizen.  If an individual's 'protective cocoon' relies on the 
construction and defence of a coherent 'narrative of self-identity’ (Giddens, 1991), 
intensified efforts to problematize and punish speeding may challenge the 
individual’s ability to maintain a coherent and consistent sense of who they are.  
Research suggests that a key element of the respectable identity claimed by some 
drivers was the notion of ‘being law-abiding’ (Wells, 2012: 106). Here, individuals 
are choosing a commitment to acting in a legal fashion as a defining characteristic 
of their identity. As a result, they presumably intend and expect that their lives 
will proceed free from censure and criminalisation. However, the use of risk as a 
justifying logic for intervention means that a stated intention to obey the law is no 
protection from criminal problematisation. Rather than laws 'provid[ing] the 
  
necessary architecture in which people can plan and carry out good-faith social 
cooperation' (Luban, 2002: 296) a risk-prevention logic means that behaviour can 
be rendered punishable regardless of whether or not it was intentional. Follow this 
up with the use of strict liability laws and self-defined 'law-abiding' individuals who 
never intended to break laws can nonetheless find themselves being punished as 
law-breakers. Either that, or they can adopt resistant behaviours which leave their 
identities intact.  
‘Respectability’ can also include a commitment to morality (Wells, 2012: 
108). Drivers who conceptualised themselves in these terms saw themselves as 
moral citizens who made moral choices and, as such, they assumed that their 
stance insulated them from accusations of immorality. However, the increasing 
regulation of road use based around risk premises has also seen its increasing 
moralisation. Actions alleged to result in risk are re-conceptualised as bad rather 
than unfortunate, so that where we once had road ‘accidents’ (the result of bad 
luck and unhappy chance), road ‘crashes’ are increasingly fault-based events, 
determined by criminal law. Lea notes that 'criminalization' should be seen as 
more than 'simply a tactic for dealing with groups of individuals who constitute 
obstructions' (Lea, 2002: 139). The police (the identifiable authority behind speed 
limit enforcement) carry with them an 'aura', or symbolic meaning, which renders 
the issues they encounter moralised (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: 33). The 
moralisation of traffic offending within a strict liability framework means that 
drivers can feel they are being morally judged for offences which did not in 
themselves represent bad moral choices. Given that offending can be unintended 
and result from an intention to act morally, a moral stance is no longer sufficient 
to insulate a driver from moral criticism, nor from criminalisation. A gadget, 
however, such as a speed camera detector, can offer just that sort of protection 
from troubling implications.  
 
Adopting a ‘risk’ approach, and developing technology that enables mass 
enforcement, has resulted in previously ‘moral’, ‘law-abiding’ populations being 
drawn in to the systems of law enforcement. Such identities, which used to be 
sufficient to deflect or resist responsibility for criminal acts, offer no such 
protection from a concern to reduce risk. That acts of resistance are the result, 
and that these include simply subverting the abilities of the camera to apply the 
‘criminal’ label, should be no surprise. Resistance removes the need to engage in 
wholesale re-evaluations of who one is, or would like to be. In doing so, it also 
displaces the original enforcement rationale, and undermines the effectives of the 
technology. Just because a risk-based narrative means that a behaviour is fair-
game, and that technology means it can realistically be enforced, does not mean 
that those who suddenly find themselves on the receiving end of it will accept its 
implications. De-responsibilisation – the resistance of responsibility – is perhaps to 
be expected in such circumstances.  
 
The case of the speed camera therefore demonstrates the dangers of doing what 
can be done when the target population does not subscribe to the reasons why it is 
being done. Without the underlying commitment to the logic of speed limits, the 
speed camera simply becomes (at best) an obstacle to swift travel, or (at worst) a 
form of state-sponsored victimization. Many forms of resistance to this particular 
technology –  such as the very basic response of slowing down for cameras before 
speeding up again - may be unthinking, unarticulated acts of resistance; simple 
  
noncompliant responses to a technology that is fallible and that enforces a law 
that does not resonate with (or in some cases actively threatens) those subject to 
it. They are, therefore, rational attempts at responsibilised self-defence 
behaviour. The aggressor just happens to be the state, rather than the more 
traditional offender that the state wishes victims to take precautions against. 
Indeed many drivers evidence support for speed cameras when used to detect the 
dangerous, inconsiderate, excessive or just plain annoying behaviour of other 
drivers that they experience as threatening (Wells, 2007; Blincoe et al, 2006), only 
objecting when their own activities are ‘threatened’.  
But what of other roads-based enforcement technologies? Can the same logics and 
theorisation be applied there? What about Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
technologies and their associated software? Can the same forms of resistance be 
identified in this case, and if not, how can that be explained?  
 
ANPR 
ANPR was, in the UK context at least, deliberately marketed as being ‘not speed 
cameras’  (Wells, 2012:182-4) with its ability to detect ‘real’  criminals (of the sort 
that we can reassuringly identify ourselves in opposition to) promoted. Its ability 
to detect the uninsured, untaxed, unlicensed motorist, as well as the drug dealer, 
the illegal immigrant, or even the terrorist can be seen as deliberate attempts to 
reassure the majority of motorists that this technology was for their benefit, not 
to be construed as a source of harm and therefore as a focus for resistance or 
neutralisation. The focus is thus on legitimate criminal targets (intentional, 
culpable, and not the sort of thing ‘we’ might get involved in accidentally), leading 
to the arrest of ‘real criminals’  whose traffic offending is a risk factor for other 
criminal activity. By ‘denying criminals the use of the roads’  (ACPO, 2005) those 
roads are, by implication, made safer for the rest of ‘us’.  These ‘real’  crimes are 
also, comfortingly, those that place us in the position of potential victim and so 
reaffirm the state’s role as protector of us from them, and the police’s focus on 
other people for our benefit. Clearly, the technology itself is also harder to resist 
in terms of practical driving actions (fake number plates would be one option, but 
their use is impossible to quantify), but the technology has certainly failed to 
produce the levels of anxiety generated by speed cameras, despite being focused 
on road users in the same way. 
Though, by contrast to the speed camera context, there has been relatively little 
public opinion research carried out in relation to ANPR, the public concerns that 
are apparent include more expected concerns about the use or abuse of 
surveillance cameras and  the information generated, utilizing more familiar civil 
liberties and ‘Big Brother’  narratives (Haines & Wells, 2012). As such, ANPR only 
raises concerns, it seems, when its focus on its ‘proper objects’  (Fiske, 1993: 235) 
is neglected and it suggests the potential for exposing the rest of us to harm 
through not being used enough (Haines & Wells, 2012).  
Such ideas are also in evidence in objections to the use of ‘spy’  cameras on the 
school run (Daily Mail, 2013), or to enforce parking (Telegraph, 2014) and bus lane 
restrictions (Daily Mail, 2014). Kearon notes a story in which a camera system 
  
developed ‘to catch terrorists’  is then wrongly used is used to spy on a ‘middle 
class family’. He observes that the technology’s use in this way is deemed unfair, 
but that “this rarely translates into a fully formed critique of surveillance per se. 
In these examples of public responses to perceived misuse of surveillance 
technologies, we see a significant tension emerging between support for the 
appropriate use of surveillance technologies and concerns that the wrong members 
of society have become the subjects of the surveillant gaze” (Kearon, 2013:423).  
The increasing use of dashboard cameras, whilst pointed at other road users rather 
than the authorities, may be similarly theorised: roads are dangerous places where 
others may seek to cause you risk. These may be bad drivers, reckless pedestrians, 
or ‘crash for cash’  perpetrators. The dashboard camera serves as a permanent 
record of what happened ‘out there’  should anyone come into contact with you in 
a way that threatens to cause you physical, financial, or reputational harm. It is 
surveillance directed outward –  technology employed in self-defence. To the 
rationally thinking, ontologically insecure, traditional recipient of police 
protection, not police power, the purchase of a mini-CCTV camera and the speed 
camera detector –sitting side by side on the dashboard –  may appear entirely 
compatible and logical purchases. The fact that one defends them from ‘others’ 
whilst the other defends them from the state is, perhaps, irrelevant, when laws 
become detached from their moral underpinnings such that they are simply 
another risk to be negotiated by the responsibilised neo-liberal citizen.  
It is clear that, for many, the idea of a simple dichotomy of ‘criminals’  and ‘law-
abiding people’ persists despite the fact that, increasingly, risk-based enforcement 
questions the relevance of an inherent difference between those deemed 
problematic by surveillance systems and those that may indeed have nothing to 
fear from them. ANPR reinforces, rather than undermines, this distinction, through 
its association with ‘real’  crime both on and off the roads. As in the speed camera 
context, surveillance technologies seemingly generate less concern so long as they 
remain focused on the activities of the traditionally problematized (Wells & Wills, 
2009). It is at this point that the individual (rather than dividual) nature of the 
implicated offender again becomes important. If the neo-liberal citizen does (with 
encouragement) see themselves primarily as a responsibilised victim, at risk of 
harm from a variety of ‘others’  then their perception of the technology as being 
aimed at them -  or at others on their behalf - is crucial.  
 
Airports and others 
 
The following section briefly considers a range of other law enforcement 
technologies from the same perspective on resistance to those fuller case studies 
explored above, again using the framework of the reconceptualization of offending 
and offender proposed at the outset. Electronic tagging, alcohol monitors, airport 
security, plagiarism detection and illegal downloading offer further testing ground 
for the ideas set out above.  
 
Loader et al have noted that airport security is “an uneasy mix of the taken-for-
granted (passport checks, luggage inspection systems) and the novel and contested 
(biometric passports, iris scanners, controls on liquids, full-body scanners).”  (2013: 
  
979). Certainly airports have a particular ability to thrust strangers together into 
potentially lethal situations that are characterised by fear rather than trust. Whilst 
we may be in no doubt of the immorality of the crimes that security measures are 
trying to prevent, the normative status of those measures themselves may be less 
clear and less well articulated (Woolgar & Neyland, 2013:224-5). In this case, many 
objections (to full-body scanners for example) are on privacy grounds, but that 
sense of privacy is not a universal entitlement. Again it shows evidence of self-
interest. Asking “Why should I have to do that when I know I am not a terrorist?” 
sits alongside an anxiety about the abilities of the technology to detect dangerous 
substances concealed by others (who potentially are). Measures to restrict liquids 
on flights (following the security scare of August 2006) are further evidence of the 
parallel concerns of air passengers mapped by Woolgar & Neyland (2013). 
Alongside irritation at the need to dispense with drinks ‘ground side’, and 
attempts to circumvent the restrictions, the researchers noted the striking 
reaction of passengers ‘air side’  when shown a bottle (“brandished”  by another 
passenger) which had demonstrably escaped detection. Security measures may be 
inconvenient when they imply our own risky attributes, but may be deemed 
essential when they apply to the risks attributed to the unknown (and therefore 
potentially dangerous) other –  much as we advocate the punishment of other 
speeding drivers, whilst ‘knowing’ that we can drive safely at speed ourselves.   
From the ‘real crime’  world we can observe the adaptations of the street drug 
dealer or the sex offender who, when confined to home by an electronic tag, may 
easily translate their offline activities into online versions, circumvent the 
technology and continue to offend. They may alternatively find a way to attach 
the monitoring technology to their dog (NAPO, 2012), to cut it off (BBC, 2012), to 
attach it to a false leg (BBC, 2011) or to test the technology to determine its 
limitations (Telegraph, 2013).The internal morality of the offender has not been 
changed by the wearing of the tag, so if a technology can be fooled (or indeed if it 
is withdrawn at the end of the sentence), it will be. There is no inner change to 
defend against that. Rather than opportunities for circumventing the technology, 
such responses by ‘real criminals’  are viewed as dangerous shortcomings of the 
technology and reason for them to be improved, or for their wearers to be 
imprisoned instead –  for the safety of the law abiding majority of their potential 
victims. 
 
As Marx has noted, there are various ways around devices that measure blood or 
breath for proscribed substances, and proscribed levels of substances (2003: n.p.). 
Alcohol measuring devices in cars and, no doubt, on the person can be fooled. The 
person who gets their child to blow into such a device to allow them to continue 
driving, for example, has, rather obviously, missed the point of the device, but the 
device (or at least its proponents) have also missed the point about the presumed 
rationality of the target. Rationality may go beyond the anticipated, hoped-for 
weighing up of pro and cons leading to the selection of law-abiding actions, to 
include rational ways of continuing to engage in problematic behaviour. The 
technology cannot alter underlying beliefs, whilst the criminal justice enterprise 
itself has shied away from this transformative ambition in recent decades.  
 
In his 2004 article, Haggerty drew attention to the use of “computerized 
informational kiosks”  in place of parole officers in New York (2004: 223). He 
  
observes that “[s]uch technologies assist in transforming what was originally 
envisioned as a ‘helping’  profession into an agency engaging in routine forms of 
technological surveillance, with individual officers taking it on trust that their 
monitoring tools accurately depict the physical location (and occasionally the 
sobriety) of their virtual charges.”  (ibid). Whilst technology presents an 
opportunity for the state to simplify its engagement with offenders, this also 
allows offenders to simplify their relationship with the state. The need not address 
their offending issues, they need only meet the requirements of the machine.  
 
Whilst the adaptations of the drink driver, paroled or tagged offender are drawn 
from the ‘real crime’  corner, other examples help to suggest that this ability to 
ignore or overlook the offence-prevention aims of technology has more widespread 
significance. Justifications for illegal downloading of music and films show similar 
characteristics, with some of those involved utilising techniques of neutralisation 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957) and others not seeing the need to justify their behaviour at 
all (Ulsperger, et al, 2010). Explanations include an unknown or faceless victim for 
whom the harm appears negligible, the availability of a loophole (perhaps for only 
a short while until it is closed), the viewing of the downloading as ‘borrowing’  or 
helping with promoting the product, and the widespread nature of the offence. 
Little has seemingly been achieved in terms of communicating the immorality of 
this kind of theft, with most offenders anxious to see themselves as different from 
the shoplifters with which they are often compared (Wingrove, Korpas, & Weisz, 
2011). If the satellite television company provides a pin number that allows their 
services to be viewed by the bill payer at a variety of locations, what harm is there 
in sharing that pin number with one, two, three or a hundred ‘friends’? At what 
point does the ‘exploitation’  of the capacities and limitations of the technology 
become a pejorative term? 
 
The introduction of plagiarism-detection software in many higher education 
establishments was met with almost immediate concerns about (and examples of) 
how this could be circumvented. Emphasis on the capacities of the tool, rather 
than the reasons for its introduction, would be ill-advised if the wider crime-
control context is anything to go by. But it is not only students that see, and 
exploit, the limitations of the technologies designed to assess their work. In 2014 
The  Washington  Post carried an article about the discovery of a peer reviewing 
scandal at an academic journal. In this example, a writer had taken advantage of 
the limitations of an online, email-based, largely-automated peer review system to 
review their own papers and approve them for publication (Washington Post, 
2014). When simple substitute measures such as ‘outputs’  replace more meaningful 
ones such as ‘quality’, and when there is sufficient contempt for those 
measurements as reflections of true value, then such responses are as likely as any 
other kind of adaptive offending behaviour. The reward can be achieved in a 
simpler way with the use of a few avoidance strategies and an appreciation of the 
limits of the tool being used to make the judgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Conclusions 
 
By looking at crime-control technologies as either facilitators of, or obstacles to, 
our freedom to act as we wish, we may come some way towards answering the 
question of why some techno-fixes get welcomed and demanded, whilst others 
inspire resistance. Where technology shows limitations (as it inevitably does), the 
lack of an effectively communicated and justified enforcement rationale, means 
that law enforcement technologies are ripe for exploitation, adaptive techniques, 
resistance and avoidance. The moral message is not sufficiently strong as to 
provide an effective cushion to insulate where their technological capabilities fall 
short.  
Whilst it may appear odd to locate the adaptation strategies of street criminals 
who want to avoid capture by CCTV alongside the activities of drivers in response 
to speed cameras, this is a potentially fruitful task. Whilst one may be seen as 
adaptation and the other resistance, it really only seems to be the fact that the 
latter are ’different’  to your ‘average’  offender that makes us see one as strategic 
and the other as potentially ideological. In the end both are people not wanting to 
be stopped from doing something they find advantageous, and finding ways around 
the limited capacities of technological law enforcement. In each case, the moral 
reasons for complying with the technology are neutralised or simply not 
considered. 
Whilst law enforcement technologies are intended to motivate the potential 
offender to choose a law-abiding path, and the potential victim of crime to take 
extra steps to prevent their victimisation, it is perhaps inevitable that, on 
accepting the logic of their own responsibility, those individuals also take steps to 
protect themselves from state attempts to restrict their behaviour. Without a 
strong moral message being communicated by law enforcement technologies, 
perhaps these interventions become simply another potential threat –  an obstacle 
to be avoided/managed/evaded. Resistance, then, simply becomes evidence of 
responsibilised rational choice actors making rational decisions which allow them 
to continue to behave in ways that have been previously deemed advantageous. 
Given that identities are increasingly constructed partly through purchasing of 
goods (Haggerty, 2004: 217), why wouldn’t some of those goods be 
deresponsibilising (allowing responsibility to be resisted) as well as 
responsibilising? (Wells, 2007).  If a tool exists to protect you from prosecution 
(from ‘victimisation by the state’), why wouldn’t the responsibilised neo-liberal 
citizen consider purchasing it just as they would consider purchasing a tool that 
protected them from more traditionally-conceived victimisation?  
 
The findings of these case studies suggest that the self-interested resistance 
emerges more easily in the current political climate, alongside a persistent 
acceptance of control where it applies to the ‘other’. Resistance to technology (or 
indeed to surveillance more generally) should not, therefore, be encouraged 
uncritically, nor viewed as necessarily a positive or empowering activity. For 
many, increased exposure to technological control is not opposed on the grounds 
that it is intrusive or contrary to any notion of human rights or social justice.  
  
Felson has argued that, although offenders should always be expected to adapt, 
this “should not discourage crime prevention, but rather…encourage more 
foresight among those seeking to prevent crime. We must expect that offenders 
will try to overcome defences by their intended victims, while devising defences of 
their own against counterattacks.”  (2006: 148). The complicating factor in the 
kinds of regulatory use of technology  looked at here is that, increasingly, and for 
reasons detailed above, it is not always clear who is victim and who is offender, 
and whether official versions of this dichotomy tally with those of the public on 
the receiving end of technological interventions. Felson’s claim that “[i]f we know 
how offenders adapt, perhaps we can help the rest of society keep pace”  (ibid: 
147) perpetuates the common but problematic assumption that people are one 
thing or the other, not that an increase in regulation, a de-emphasising of a 
normative basis for the law, a focus (instead) on risk, and an encouragement to 
responsibilise means that that line is blurred. Rather than view ‘the rest’  as trying 
to outwit offenders, perhaps we need to realise that ‘they’  too are increasingly 
likely and able to adapt when that blurred line places their own behaviours under 
scrutiny. Regardless of one’s position on crime control, risk, neo-liberalism, power 
or any other framing approach, it seems unwise to meander into a situation where 
the only thing stopping people from behaving as they wish (harmful to others, 
themselves, or to no-one), is the ability and availability of law enforcement 
technologies that can stop them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
References  
Barlow A & Duncan S. 2000. ‘Supporting families? New Labour's communitarianism 
and the 'rationality mistake': Part I’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 
22(1): 23-42 
Bauman Z. 1987. Legislators and Interpreters. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
BBC. 2011, 29th August. ‘G4S sacks pair who tagged offender's false leg’ available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-14705328 [retrieved 10/11/14] 
BBC. 2012, 14th June. ‘Electronic tags: Curfew claims concern Theresa May’ 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18432500 [retrieved on 10/11/14] 
Blincoe K, Jones A, Sauerzapf V, & Haynes R. 2006. ‘Speeding driver’s attitudes 
and perception of speed camera in rural England’ Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 38: 371-78. 
 
Coleman R & McCahill M. 2011. Surveillance and Crime London: Sage 
Coleman R & Norris C. 2013. Introducing Criminology London: Routledge 
Corbett C. 2000. ‘A typology of drivers’ responses to speed cameras: implications 
for speed limit enforcement and road safety’. Psychology, Crime and Law, 6: 305-
30.  
Corbett C. 2003. Car Crime Devon: Willan 
Corbett C. 2008a. ‘Techno-surveillance of the roads: High impact and low interest' 
Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 10(1), pp 1-18  
Corbett C. 2008b. ‘Roads policing: Current context and imminent dangers’ 
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2(1) pp 131-142  
Cornish D & Clarke R. 1987. Reasoning Criminal. [Online] Available at 
http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/reasoningcriminal/01_introductio
n.pdf [retrieved 23/4/14] 
 
[The] Daily Mail. 2014, January 2nd. ‘Spy camera fines cost drivers £135million: 
Huge rise in bus lane and box junction offences’ available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532929/Spy-camera-fines-cost-drivers-
135million-Huge-rise-bus-lane-box-junction-offences.html [retrieved 10/11/14] 
 
[The] Daily Mail. 2013, November 4th. ‘Snooping on the school run: Cameras will 
film parents who park illegally to drop off children and send images to councils’ 
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2486027/Snooping-school-
run-Cameras-film-parents-park-illegally-drop-children.html [retrieved 10/11/14] 
 
  
Dawson D. 2012. ‘‘What do you think?’ International public opinion on cameras 
surveillance’ in Doyle, A Lippert, R & Lyon, D. Eyes Everywhere: The Global 
Growth of Camera Surveillance, New York: Routledge 
 
Deleuze G. 1995. Negotiations 1972-1990. New York: Columbia University Press 
 
Ditton J. 1998. ‘Public Support for Town Centre CCTV Schemes: Myth or Reality?’ 
in Norris, C, Moran, J  & Armstrong, G (eds) CCTV, Surveillance and Social Control 
Surrey: Ashgate 
 
Doyle A, Lippert R, & Lyon D. 2012. Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of 
Camera Surveillance New York: Routledge 
Emsley C. 1993. ‘'Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren't Any Motors?' 
The Law, the Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900-1939’ 
The Historical Journal, 36(2): 357-81 
Ekblom P. 1997. ‘Gearing up against crime: a dynamic framework to help designers 
keep up with the adaptive criminal in a changing world’ International Journal of 
Risk Security and Crime Prevention 2: 249–65 
Feeley M & Simon J. 1992. ‘The new penology: notes on the emerging strategy for 
corrections’ Criminology 30(4): 449–75 
 
Feeley M & Simon J. 1994. ‘Actuarial justice: the emerging new criminal law’ in 
Nelken, D  (ed.) The Futures of Criminology London: Sage 
 
Felson M. 2006. Crime and Nature London: Sage 
Fiske J 1993. Power Plays, Power Works. London: Verso.  
  
Fyfe N & Bannister J. 1996. ‘City watching: closed circuit television surveillance in 
public spaces’, Area, 28(1): 37-46 
Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gill M & Spriggs A. 2005. Assessing the impact of CCTV. Home Office report, 
Available at https://www.cctvusergroup.com/downloads/file/Martin%20gill.pdf 
[retrieved 23/4/14] 
 
Gilliom J. 2006. ‘Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance, Consciousness and 
Identity’ in Haggerty K & Ericson R (eds) Surveillance and Visibility Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 
 
Haines A & Wells H. 2012. ‘Persecution or protection? Understanding the 
differential public response to two road-based surveillance systems’. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice, 12(3): 257-73 
Haggerty K. 2004. ‘Displaced Expertise: Three Constraints on the Policy relevance 
of Criminological Thought’ Theoretical Criminology 8(2): 211-31  
  
  
Hollander J & Einwohner R. 2004. ‘Conceptualizing Resistance’ Sociological Forum 
(19)4: 533-54 
 
Giddens A. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity Cambridge: Polity Press 
Kearon T. 2013. ‘Surveillance technologies and the crises of confidence in 
regulatory agencies’ Criminology and Criminal Justice 13: 415-30 
 
Kemshall H. 2003. Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice Maidenhead: OUP 
Lea, J. 2002. Crime and Modernity. London: Sage. 
Loader I & Sparks R. 2002. ‘Contemporary landscapes of crime, order and control: 
governance, risk and globalisation’, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A. 2003. Policing and the Condition of England. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
 
Loader I, Goold B & Thumala A. 2013. 'The Banality of Security: The Curious Case 
of Surveillance Cameras' British Journal of Criminology 53(6): 977-96. 
Luban, D. 2002. The Publicity of Law and the Regulatory State. Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 10(3), 296–316. 
Marx G. 1995. ‘The Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet’, 
in Hagan, J & Peterson, R (eds) Crime and Inequality, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Marx G. 2003. ‘A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New 
Surveillance’ Journal of Social Issues 59(2): 369-90. 
 
Marx G. 2009. ‘A Tack in the Shoe and Taking off the Shoe: Neutralization and 
Counter-neutralization Dynamics’ Surveillance and Society 6(3): 294-306 
McGuire M. 2012. Technology Crime and Justice Routledge: London. 
McQuade S. 2006. ‘Technology-enabled Crime, Policing and Security’ in The 
Journal of Technology Studies. 32(1) (no page numbers) 
 
Mythen G. 2005. ‘Employment, individualisation and insecurity: Rethinking the risk 
society perspective’ The Sociological Review 8(1): 129-49 
National Association of Probation Officers. 2012. Electronic tagging: a flawed 
system NAPO Briefing, available at 
https://www.napo.org.uk/sites/default/files/Electronic%20Tagging%20a%20flawed
%20system.pdf [retrieved 9/11/14] 
Norris C. 2012. ‘There’s no success like failure and failure’s no success at all’ in 
Doyle A, Lippert R & Lyon D (eds) Eyes Everywhere: The global growth of Camera 
Surveillance. London: Routledge 
 
  
PACTS. 2005. Policing Road Risk: Enforcement, Technologies and Road Safety 
Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety, London: PACTS .  
Povey D, Mulchandani R, Hand T, & Kaur Panesar L. 2011. Police Powers and 
Procedures England and Wales 2009/10. Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/11. 
London: Home Office. 
  
Raby R. 2005. ‘What is Resistance?’ Journal of Youth Studies, 8(2): 151-72. 
 
Rose N. 1996. ‘The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government’ 
Economy and Society, 25(3): 327–56. 
 
Short E & Ditton J. 1998. ‘Seen and Now Heard: Talking to the Targets of Open 
Street CCTV’ British Journal of Criminology. 38(3): 404-28 
 
Taylor I, Evans K & Fraser P. 1996. A Tale of Two Cities: Global Changes, Local 
Feeling and Everyday Life in the North of England London: Routledge 
[The] Telegraph. 2013, May 20th. ‘Teenage burglar with electronic tag pulls a fast 
one on G4S security official’ available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10068353/Teenage-burglar-
with-electronic-tag-pulls-a-fast-one-on-G4S-security-official.html [retrieved 
10/11/14] 
 
[The] Telegraph. 2014, June 23rd. ‘CCTV ‘spy cars’ for parking enforcement to be 
banned’ Available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/10920181/CCTV-spy-cars-for-
parking-enforcement-to-be-banned.html [retrieved on 10/11/14] 
 
Ulsperger J, Hodges S & Paul J. 2010. ‘Pirates on the Plank: Neutralization Theory 
and the Criminal Downloading of Music Among Generation Y in the Era of Late 
Modernity’ in Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture, 17(1): 124-51. 
 
Waiton S. 2010. The Politics of Surveillance: Big Brother on Prozac. Surveillance & 
Society 8(1): 61-84 
 
Washington Post. 2014. An obscure academic journal. A memorable peer review 
scandal. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/07/11/the-most-brazen-peer-review-scandal-anyone-can-
remember/ [retrieved 06.11.14] 
 
Wells H. 2007. ‘Risk, Respectability and Responsibilisation: Unintended driver 
responses to speed limit enforcement’. Internet Journal of Criminology (no 
edition, no page numbers)  
 
Wells H. 2011. ‘Risk and expertise in the speed limit enforcement debate: 
Challenges, adaptations and responses’ Criminology and Criminal Justice, 11(3): 
225-41 
  
Wells H. 2012. The Fast and the Furious: Drivers, speed cameras and control in a 
risk society. Surrey: Ashgate 
Wells H & Wills D. 2009. ‘Individualism and Identity: Resistance to Speed Cameras 
in the UK’. Surveillance and Society, 6(3): 259-74  
Wingrove T, Korpas A & Weisz V. 2011. ‘Why were millions of people not obeying 
the law? Motivational influences on non-compliance with the law in the case of 
music piracy’ Psychology, Crime and Law, 17(3): 261-76.  
 
Woolgar S & Neyland D. 2013.  Mundane Governance: Ontology and Accountability 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Zedner L. 2009. Security London: Routledge 
 
